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Abstract  10 
Ecosystems provide services for many stakeholder groups, often with a conflict of interests that 11 
hampers sustainability. Core to these conflicts is the challenge of trading-off monetary and non-12 
monetary measures. Presenting a socio-ecologically integrated trade-off model, and using the boreal 13 
forest as a case, we outline the performance of partly competing services (game hunting, livestock 14 
grazing and wood) when land sharing is the preferred option. Drawing on multi-criteria analyses 15 
(MCA), we made factorial comparisons of both monetary (net present value) and non-monetary (e.g., 16 
number of game, livestock meat) output from scenarios with contrasting service priorities. Wood 17 
production unequivocally yielded the highest net present value, but led to a substantial reduction in the 18 
performance of hunting and grazing. By imposing multiuse conditions set as minimum performance of 19 
the less profitable services, we evaluated the opportunity costs of multiuse without direct pricing of 20 
non-commodities. We also quantified normalized indices of realized performance potential to evaluate 21 
the cost of multiuse with a single, joint metric. Both approaches clearly and consistently show how the 22 
forest owner’s accepting a relatively small loss in one service may secure large gains in other services. 23 
By democratically providing a comprehensive monetary and non-monetary evaluation, our approach 24 
should generate broader acceptance for the decisional metrics among stakeholders. It thereby has the 25 
potential to mitigate conflicts, feeding into the larger scheme of adaptive management. 26 
  27 
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1 Introduction 29 
With a steadily rising human population and increasing needs for renewable resources, policymaking 30 
for ecosystems services is more challenging than ever (Lindenmayer et al. 2012). Such intensification 31 
of pressures on resources raises the potential for conflict between stakeholder interests, because most 32 
ecosystems are utilized for different and competing services (de Groot et al. 2010). This is 33 
counterproductive to sustainability, given that conflicts exacerbate overexploitation (sensu the tragedy 34 
of the commons, Hardin 1968) (Redpath et al. 2015). In some cases conflicts may be socially 35 
productive by disrupting skewed distribution of benefits (Tjosvold 1991). More typically, however, 36 
conflicts also hamper socioeconomic value creation (Arancibia 2013; Hotte 2001), a proclaimed goal 37 
of many nations around the globe (Bioeconomy Council 2013; OECD 2009). 38 
Our ability to solve these conflicts is limited by a lack of scientific approaches that can aid in 39 
comprehensively identifying the optimal management strategy when stakeholder interests clash 40 
(Maxwell et al. 2014; Redpath et al. 2013). There is broad consensus that incorporating the views of 41 
all interest groups is essential for managing conflicts (e.g., Dennis et al. 2005; Kyllönen et al. 2006). 42 
With ecosystem services, comprehensive approaches typically must involve trading off multiple 43 
interests (Rodríguez et al. 2006, 2012), adding complexity to the challenge. At the heart of these 44 
shortcomings is a persistent dichotomy between monetary and non-monetary goals, and the inherent 45 
difficulties of finding joint decision metrics that the opposing parties can agree upon (Wam 2010). 46 
How and whether we should evaluate non-marketable ecosystem services is no small debate. 47 
Alternative currencies have been put forward, such as energy (McKibben 2007) or happiness 48 
(MacKerron 2012), but the decisional power remains in the favour of interests operating in monetary 49 
markets (Adamowicz 2004). Non-monetary measures are nevertheless imperative to the sustainable 50 
use of ecosystem services as the limits ultimately is biophysical, not economic (Fischer et al. 2007). 51 
Advancement of ways to calculate and combine decision metrics in trade-off protocols is therefore 52 
gaining research focus (Diaz-Balteiro & Romero 2008; Ostrom 2007; Schlüter et al. 2014). Poff et al. 53 
(2010), for example, illustrate a most comprehensive use of compromise programming to aid multi-54 
criteria decision planning by simultaneously optimizing multiple objectives (e.g., plant productivity, 55 
biodiversity, streamflow rates, habitat suitability and willingness-to-pay for recreation opportunities). 56 
This much-aspired inclusiveness comes with a cost of immense trade-off complexity, which forces 57 
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that we measure service performances by some kind of normalized indices. Planning participants 58 
typically find it difficult to interpret such relative indices (Kangas et al. 2001), and prefer to base their 59 
decisions on hands-on measures like biomass or money (but see Adamowicz 2004, p. 439). Along 60 
with the ongoing and promising development of multi-criteria analysis (collectively labelled MCA), 61 
we advocate to simultaneously explore other ways of implementing trade-off assessment without 62 
direct pricing, yet within the ruling scheme of monetary exchange protocols (for a recent review of 63 
established and suggested such approaches, see Schuhmann & Mahon 2015).  64 
Aiming at socio-ecological integration, we outline a dynamic trade-off model for the optimization 65 
of ecosystem services with partly conflicting stakeholder interests, when land sharing is the preferred 66 
option. The inclusion of non-monetary goals and concerns adds new dimensions to the underlying 67 
traditional Pareto optimization. Drawing on goal programming (Tamiz et al. 1998), we made factorial 68 
comparisons of both monetary and non-monetary output from scenarios with contrasting service 69 
priorities. By imposing multiuse conditions set as minimum performance of the less profitable 70 
services, we evaluated the opportunity costs of multiuse without direct pricing of the non-commodities 71 
(Fig. 1). Drawing also on elements from compromise programming (Zeleny 1974), we additionally 72 
quantified normalized indices of realized performance potential to evaluate the cost of multiuse with a 73 
single, joint measure. By democratically providing a comprehensive monetary and non-monetary 74 
evaluation, our approach should generate broader stakeholder acceptance for the decisional metrics 75 
(Ostrom 2007; Milner-Gulland 2011). It thereby has the potential to mitigate conflicts, feeding into the 76 
larger schemes of adaptive management, such as the management strategy evaluation (Mapstone et al. 77 
2008) or multi-criteria decision support (Kangas & Kangas 2005). 78 
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 79 
Figure 1. The use of one ecosystem service may both impede and facilitate other services, as partly 80 
illustrated above using forest as a case: wood logging in older forest (stage III-IV) substantially 81 
contributes to food carrying capacity for moose and livestock, but livestock cause trampling damages 82 
and moose cause browsing damage to the new recruitment of trees (stage I-II). In our trade-off model, 83 
we sequentially assess the effects of favouring single or all stakeholder groups on not only monetary 84 
output (net present value), but also goods and services (hunting, wood and meat). Because different 85 
stakeholder groups have different goals and gains, also of non-economic value, trading-off the 86 
conflicting services using only a monetary measure is likely to exacerbate conflict.87 
6 
 
2 Model framework 88 
2.1 Model objectives  89 
We used the Nordic boreal forest as a case study, with three partly competing services: wood 90 
production, game hunting (moose Alces alces) and livestock grazing (sheep Ovis aries, cattle Bos 91 
taurus.) Here we test four scenarios with contrasting objective functions: (1) prioritize wood 92 
production (WOOD), (2) prioritize game hunting (HUNT), (3) prioritize livestock grazing (GRAZ), 93 
and (4) prioritize multiuse: i.e. maximize total performance given various levels of multiuse conditions 94 
(TRI-0 = no such conditions, TRI-L = low levels, TRI-H = high levels). The TRI-L and TRI-H 95 
represent non-Pareto solutions, where we imposed conditions as minimum performance of less-96 
profitable services (see also Fig. 4 for additional multiuse levels).  97 
We ran the model as a non-linear numerical optimization problem (NLP) in GAMS (20.7, 98 
Windows NT) using the CONOPT3® solver (Drud 2006). We first solved our objective function by 99 
applying a maximization statement on the net present value equation of interest (eq. 1-4, depending on 100 
the ecosystem service to be prioritized). As an alternative to these objective functions based on net 101 
present value, we also optimized the model using normalized indices of realized performance potential 102 
(eq. 7). Here we applied a parallel to the approach used in compromise programming of minimizing 103 
the distance to an ideal, but unattainable point (Zeleny 1974). By minimizing the sum of these 104 
distances across all three ecosystem services, we could further explore the effects of multiuse by 105 
assigning equal or different weights to each service. Different weighting of services may be crucial in 106 
the final decision process when non-commodities are involved (Hajkowicz 2008). 107 
 108 
2.2 Model structure 109 
To facilitate readability we have kept most of the mathematics in the supplementary appendix. In the 110 
following equations with an A in front refers to this appendix. The growth of both tree and animal 111 
populations were modelled with a stage-structured version (Usher 1966, 1969) of basic Leslie matrices 112 
(Leslie 1945) (eq. A1-A6). The model is projected at one-year intervals over a finite planning period, 113 
assuming discrete reproduction and mortality. Reflecting what is recognizable for the hunters, the 114 
moose population Mt consists of five stages (calves, female or male yearlings, older cows or bulls). 115 
The cattle population Ct consists of four stages (female or male calves, female heifers, older cows). 116 
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The sheep population St has only three stages as sheep give birth as yearlings (female or male lambs, 117 
older ewes). Livestock males 1+ years old are not allowed on forest pastures, so their survival is set to 118 
zero. In the model, they must therefore be slaughtered in their first year of life to generate income. 119 
The forest is divided into strata comprising two variables: the tree species of commercial interest 120 
(Norway spruce Picea abies, Scots pine Pinus silvestris and birch Betula spp.), and the site’s innate 121 
capacity to produce forest (hereafter termed Site Index: low (H40 = 7-11), intermediate (H40 = 14-17) 122 
and high (H40 = 21) (see Tveite 1977). For each stratum we have four tree stages: I = trees covered by 123 
snow in winter and unavailable to foraging animals (tree height 0.0–0.3 m), II = trees with major parts 124 
of their crown within all-year reach of foraging animals (tree height 0.3–3.0 m), III and IV = trees with 125 
their crowns fully above the reach of foraging animals. Average age intervals of stages are given in the 126 
supplementary appendix, Table A.1. Only trees in stages III and IV have market value. New trees are 127 
always recruited after harvest, and only to stage I. We assume that all logging is undertaken as clear-128 
felling (an important assumption when calculating costs and animal carrying capacity). 129 
Density dependent ungulate-forest interactions are included in the model by adding a non-linear 130 
function to the population projections (eq. A7). We base these functions on logistic growth, so that the 131 
effect is less intense initially, and then increases before levelling off towards carrying capacity 132 
saturation (eq. A8). The forest’s capacity to sustain foraging ungulates (denoted Km, Ks and Kc for 133 
moose, sheep and cattle respectively) consists of two parts (eq. A9). One is the basic carrying capacity, 134 
defined as the number of animals sustained when the entire forest is in the least forage producing stage 135 
(stage III). The other part is added capacity from forest stages other than stage III. Recently logged 136 
sites (stage II) are of particular importance, because of their much higher forage abundance. The added 137 
capacity for each stage varies with tree stratum and animal species. For example, stage I (field layer 138 
dominated by grass) is of higher value to cattle than to moose, while stage IV (field layer dominated 139 
by bilberry) is of higher value to moose than to cattle.  140 
Hunted moose (ht,k) and slaughtered livestock (sct,k, sst,k) generate a monetary value (pm, pc, ps) 141 
(€) paid per kilo of meat (dressed carcass weight wmk, wck, wsk). For moose, there is also a fixed stage-142 
specific hunting fee paid per animal hunted (phk), irrespective of body mass. Total net present value of 143 
moose, cattle and sheep (πm, πc, πs, respectively) (€) is:  144 
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where t is the discount factor, which is included because future income is associated with uncertainty 148 
(for a discussion of the dilemmas of discounting, see Philibert 2003) and pdays are the number of days 149 
in the forest pasturing season (reflecting that livestock income does not only stem from forest 150 
pasturing). The species-specific constants k and k adjust the density influence on animal body mass 151 
(influence being stronger for sub-adults). As a rule of thumb, boreal forest plants can sustain a 152 
browsing intensity which removes about 1/3 of their current growth (Speed et al. 2013). Therefore, k 153 
and k are set to reduce body mass fairly slowly until Mt /Kmt is about 1/3, then intensifying before 154 
levelling off when Mt/Kmt reaches about 2/3, reflecting that foraging will be increasingly energy costly 155 
to obtain as tree growth and the available biomass/tree declines. MEV, CEV and SEV in eq. 1-3 are 156 
expectation values, included to avoid complete decimation of the populations at the end of the 157 
planning period (see eq. A12 in supplementary appendix).  158 
Trees are harvested at various stages in each stratum. The total net present value (f) is: 159 
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where pfs is the net revenue (harvesting costs deducted) (€) per m3 of wood cut in stratum s, ut,s is the 161 
amount of wood (m3) cut at time t (volumes of trees are stage-specific for a given stratum), cfs is the 162 
fixed cost of conducting one cutting session (e.g., costs of moving equipment between sites, or pre-163 
cutting surveys). Because our model is not spatially explicit, we have to assume that all cutting within 164 
a stratum-specific stage represents one cutting session (thus if a stratum is cut in a given year, one unit 165 
of cfs will be deducted). af is the fixed administrative cost of managing the forest. The latter is 166 
deducted from the wood income (rather than game or livestock) as forestry normally is the focal 167 
interest of landowners in Nordic boreal forests. Forest recruitment after cutting is associated with a 168 
cost in spruce forest crs (i.e. planting of nursery grown saplings, eq. A11), but not in pine or birch 169 
forest (which are recruited by natural seeding). FEV is the forest expectation value (see eq. A10):  170 
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In eq. 4, cMt and cCt are the costs of having moose and cattle in the forest, in terms of browsing 171 
damage on pines in stage II (moose), and trampling damage on spruce and birch in stages I-II (cattle). 172 
In this study, moose is not considered to cause commercial damage to birch or spruce. Only pines in 173 
stage II are damaged by moose browsing, because trees in stage I are covered by snow in winter (pine 174 
is winter forage for moose). Trampling damage does not pertain to pine as pine clear-cuts do not have 175 
the intense upsurge of grass coverage that cattle are seeking. In this study, sheep are not considered to 176 
damage any of the tree species of commercial interest (Hjeljord et al. 2014). All damage depends on 177 
animal density and carrying capacity at the time:  178 
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where HT is the discount factor TH years in time, which corresponds to the time it takes for the average 181 
tree of stage II to reach the midpoint between stages III and IV. The monetary value of this tree )( fp is 182 
calculated as the average profit of a tree cut in stage III–IV across the strata of interest. 183 
In eq. 5, the constant bk adjusts the browsing influence of different moose stages (adults are 184 
browsing more trees than sub-adults). The proportion of pines that will be browsed increases linearly 185 
with moose density in relation to carrying capacity. The two constants α and β regulate the severity of 186 
browsing damage (i.e. the proportion of browsed trees that will lose all monetary value); it will be 187 
higher when the moose population is closer to its carrying capacity, as browsing per tree then 188 
intensifies and more trees will reach their browsing resilience limit. Because moose typically first aims 189 
at the leader shoot, which is crucial for the growth and quality of pine timber, α and β are set so that at 190 
least 50% of browsed pines will be damaged even at low moose densities. The cost of damaged pine is 191 
corrected with a stem thinning factor ψs (tree density at midpoint stage III and IV / tree density at stage 192 
II) to take into account that even without moose damage, the tree density decreases with time.  193 
In eq. 6, the constant θ is the proportion of new spruce saplings that is trampled each year per 194 
cattle-day in the forest. All cattle (cows, heifers and sucklings) are considered to make similar levels 195 
of trampling damage. Because even minor trampling damage incurs a severe reduction in future timber 196 
quality of spruce, all damaged saplings lose all their monetary value. The proportion of trampled 197 
saplings increases both with more cattle-days or with lower proportions of the forest being in stages I 198 
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and II. The latter occurs because more cattle will then aggregate in these areas, as clearcuts are highly 199 
selected habitat for cattle. As for browsed pine, the cost of damaged spruce is corrected with a 200 
thinning factor ψs (tree density at midpoint stages III and IV / tree density at stage I). 201 
We also calculated normalized indices of realized performance potential. For hunting (H) and 202 
grazing (C and S) the performances were measured in terms of kilos meat produced throughout the 203 
planning period. For wood production (F), the potential was measured in terms of net present value 204 
stemming from timber. The normalized indices of each were summed to obtain a single maximization 205 
metric (I) encompassing all three ecosystem services: 206 
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where Hmax, Cmax, Smax and Fmax are the potentials as found by maximizing each performance in 208 
individual model runs, H*, C*, S* and F* are the performances to be jointly maximized through the 209 
use of I, and wi are weighting factors to prioritize ecosystem service i in relation to the other services. 210 
Each of the performance fractions (e.g., H*/Hmax) as well as the joint metric I becomes a relative scale 211 
0-1, where 1 = maximum potential realized. 212 
  213 
2.3 Model constraints set by non-commodity concerns 214 
Not all elements of the forest ecosystem can be adequately addressed with economic theory (Wam 215 
2010). We set the following non-commodity concerns as model constraints (their effect on economic 216 
and biological output is addressed in our previous work, Wam & Hofstad 2007). 217 
(i) In line with the ethical notion of sustainability (Leopold 1949), all animal populations must 218 
remain below their specific carrying capacity at all times. 219 
(ii) Moose fecundity (as influenced by animal density) must stay ≥ 0.5 calves produced per cow 2+ 220 
years. Lower values indicate severe deterioration of health (Solberg et al. 2006). No constraint is 221 
set for livestock as their fecundity is determined ex-situ by the farming regime, and treated as a 222 
constant in the model (Table A.1). 223 
(iii) In line with perceived hunter ethics, moose calves cannot be orphaned by hunters, i.e. the number 224 
of hunted cows must not exceed the number of hunted calves divided by the live calf: cow ratio. 225 
11 
 
(iv) The moose cow: bull ratio must stay ≤ 1.8 to secure breeding conditions and to avoid delayed 226 
parturition (Sæther et al. 2003) or skewed sex-ratios of new-borns (Sæther et al. 2004). 227 
    228 
2.4 Model parameterization and parameter sensitivity 229 
To illustrate the model we used a 67 000 ha large forest (43 000 ha productive land) with baseline 230 
conditions set to resemble contemporary market values and activity levels in the Nordic countries 231 
(Table A.1-A.2). Most ecosystem services in the Nordic forests are loosely regulated by public law, 232 
and in practice managed by the landowner (private citizens, commons or companies). The landowner 233 
typically decides about forest harvesting and moose hunting, but often have less influence on the 234 
intensity of livestock grazing (Berge 2002). For example, grazing rights may stem from a time where 235 
subsistence and not commercial interests were the prevailing driver, and thus is not quantitatively 236 
limited in modern terms. Informal institutions also influence decision-making: moose hunting, for 237 
example, is a club good with strong cultural ties to local hunters (Jacobsen 2014). If the landowner 238 
prioritizes wood harvest at the expense of hunting or grazing, he may lose goodwill in the community. 239 
Forest growth, moose demography and in part moose: forest interactions were parameterized and 240 
empirically validated in our earlier work (Wam & Hofstad 2007). The model was updated with new 241 
field data on moose-forest interactions (Wam & Hjeljord 2010; Wam et al. 2010). We collected data 242 
on livestock demography from the Norwegian Agriculture Agency, and cattle trampling damage from 243 
own field studies (Hjeljord et al. 2014). Livestock habitat use and diet in forests, and their niche 244 
overlap with moose were obtained by conducting new field work (Wam, unpublished data).  245 
The planning period was set to 30 years, and the interest rate to 3%. These factors will influence 246 
the level of generated net present value, but negligibly affect the relative contribution of wood versus 247 
game or livestock when all resources are assigned expectation values (see also Table 1). All constant 248 
or initial parameter values used in the model are given in Tables A.1 and A.2. We inferred parameter 249 
sensitivity by successively rerunning the model while rescaling one parameter at a time. Due to the 250 
many parameters, we mostly report output for three input levels: contemporary settings (hereafter 251 
called baseline), a realistic lower extreme and a realistic upper extreme. For parameters with patterns 252 
of particular interest we also report selected output on a more continuous scales.  253 
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3 Results 254 
3.1 Prioritizing wood production (WOOD) 255 
Wood had about 2-3 times higher income potential than hunting and grazing (Fig. 2D), making it 256 
financially beneficial to minimize browsing and trampling damage. The optimal strategy both when 257 
maximizing net present value of wood (WOOD) and when maximizing total net present value (TRI-0), 258 
was therefore to eliminate moose and cattle, while keeping sheep at moderate densities (Fig. 2B-C). In 259 
the WOOD scenario, wood consistently contributed 98-99% of the total net present value over time, 260 
for the whole range of applied parameter settings (Table A.2). Factors facilitating contribution of 261 
wood to the total net present value (W%) were: a higher market value of timber, a higher Site Index 262 
(i.e. more productive forest land), and more pine in the forest. With all these facilitating factors 263 
combined, the WOOD scenario could generate a mean annual net value from wood production of 885 264 
€/ha (compared to 215 €/ha with parameters set at baseline).  265 
  266 
  267 
Fig. 2. Potential performance (A-C) and total net present value (D) of forest ecosystem services over 30 years 268 
according to a socio-ecologically integrated trade-off model for partly conflicting services, with the objective to 269 
maximize net present value from wood production (WOOD), game hunting (HUNT), livestock grazing (GRAZ), 270 
or total net present value given various levels of multiuse conditions. TRI-0 = no such conditions; TRI-L = low 271 
levels (at least 50 moose hunted, 100 cattle and 1 000 sheep pastured each year; TRI-H = higher levels (at least 272 
150 moose, 300 cattle and 3 000 sheep). Illustrated for a land area of 67 000 ha (43 000 ha productive forest).   273 
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3.2 Prioritizing game hunting (HUNT) 274 
The optimal strategy when prioritizing game hunting (HUNT) was to eliminate all livestock (Fig. 2C), 275 
maintain spruce harvest and reduce pine harvest (Fig. 2A). Hunting contributed a highly variable share 276 
of the total net present value, depending on parameter settings (Table A.2). Factors facilitating the 277 
contribution of hunting (H%) to the total net present value were: a higher hunting revenue (more so for 278 
fees paid per-kilo than per-capita), a higher carrying capacity, a lower Site Index, more pine in the 279 
forest, and higher damage intensity on browsed pines. With all these facilitating factors combined, the 280 
HUNT scenario could generate a mean annual net value from moose hunting of 100 €/ha (compared to 281 
15 €/ha with parameters set at baseline), i.e. only a fraction of the potential from wood production.  282 
While the wood harvest (m3/ha) did not differ a lot between the HUNT and the WOOD scenarios, 283 
the timber was logged at an earlier stage, facilitating shorter rotation times and larger areas being in 284 
the more forage-productive younger stages. This and other (kbm or s, Table A.2) improvements of the 285 
carrying capacity barely affected the total net present value, but greatly influenced the hunting 286 
opportunities. The number of moose harvested in the HUNT scenario was ten times higher than in the 287 
scenarios where moose was not explicitly prioritized (i.e. WOOD, TRI-0 and GRAZ) (Fig. 2B). Also, 288 
a higher proportion of male moose (a target preferred by many hunters) was kept in the population as 289 
well as harvested in the HUNT scenario compared to other scenarios. 290 
 291 
3.3 Prioritizing of livestock grazing (GRAZ) 292 
The optimal strategy when prioritizing livestock grazing (GRAZ) was to eliminate moose (Fig. 2B), 293 
maintain the spruce harvest and reduce the pine harvest (Fig. 2A). Livestock had a generally low share 294 
of the total net present value potential (Table A.2). Factors facilitating the relative contribution of 295 
livestock (G%) to the total net present value were: a higher meat revenue, a higher carrying capacity, a 296 
lower Site Index, and higher trampling intensity. Recall that spruce clearcuts were both the main 297 
contributor to livestock carrying capacity and subject to livestock trampling damage. Consequently, 298 
there were points of inflection in the influence of spruce proportion on livestock relative contribution 299 
to net present value (being lower at intermediate spruce dominance). Sheep had a higher income (and 300 
meat yield, Fig. 2C) potential than cattle. With all facilitating factors combined, the GRAZ scenario 301 
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could generate a mean annual net value from sheep of 40 €/ha and 8 €/ha for cattle, compared to 4 302 
€/ha and 3 €/ha with parameters at baseline (sheep and cattle prioritized in separate model runs). 303 
 304 
3.4 Evaluating the opportunity cost of multiuse using minimum performance conditions (TRI-0, TRI-L, TRI-H) 305 
Because of the superior income potential of wood, the TRI-0 scenario (i.e. maximizing total net value 306 
without multiuse conditions) essentially gave the same performance as the WOOD scenario. The only 307 
factor with noticeable influence on the relative contribution of the various ecosystem services was 308 
very high revenues from animal meat (Table 1). Livestock grazing consistently had a marginally 309 
higher contribution than moose hunting due to the lack of damage costs associated with sheep. The 310 
TRI-H scenario (higher levels of multiuse conditions) involved a 12%, and the lower level scenario 311 
TRI-L a 4%, reduction in total net present value compared to TRI-0. 312 
Compared to its effect on total net present value, adding multiuse conditions to the model more 313 
strongly affected the biological output in terms of meat produced and game hunted. Raising the 314 
minimum number of cattle in the forest had negligible influence on moose because of their low niche 315 
overlap. The forced increase in cattle density was therefore countered in the optimization by a 316 
reduction in the sheep density (Fig. 3A), in order to maintain low damage costs (i.e. a lowest possible 317 
ratio of cattle equivalents to forest area in stage I-II, eq. 6). A forced increase in the minimum number 318 
of moose in the forest was also countered by a reduction in sheep (Fig. 3B), as sheep and moose have 319 
a higher niche overlap than cattle and moose (Table A.1). Raising the minimum number of sheep 320 
allowed in the forest, on the other hand, did not influence the optimal density of either cattle or moose 321 
(Fig. 3C), as the optimal sheep density without multiuse conditions (i.e. about 20 000 animals) anyway 322 
superseded the levels we had set as minimum. 323 
In contrast, raising the multiuse conditions to higher levels (TRI-H) generated a more fair 324 
distribution of harvest loss (Fig. 4), still without jeopardizing much of the total net present value (see 325 
Fig. 2D). Without multiuse conditions (TRI-0), game hunters carried practically all the burden of 326 
being a less profitable stakeholder group. In TRI-0, their harvest was down by 90% compared to when 327 
game hunting was prioritized. The wood production, on the other hand, was down by only about 20% 328 
even with the higher multiuse conditions (TRI-H). 329 
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   330 
 331 
Fig. 3. Potential performance of forest ecosystem services over 30 years according to a socio-ecologically 332 
integrated trade-off model for partly conflicting services (wood production, moose hunting and livestock 333 
grazing), with the objective to maximize total net present value given various levels of multiuse conditions, i.e. 334 
minimum performance of the monetarily less profitable services A) cattle, B) moose, and C) sheep (profit of 335 
wood production was superior to that of moose and livestock, thus not favoured with multiuse conditions). 336 
 337 
Fig. 4. Loss of potential performance from forest ecosystem services according to a socio-ecologically integrated 338 
trade-off model for partly conflicting services (wood production, moose hunting and livestock grazing), with the 339 
objective to maximize total net present value given three levels of multiuse conditions imposed to secure 340 
minimum performance of the monetarily less profitable services (i.e. grazing and game). The harvest potential 341 
(number of moose/km2, kg livestock meat/ha or m3 of timber/ha) was calculated for a 30 year planning period, 342 
and equals the performance obtained if the ecosystem service in question was completely prioritized (i.e. 343 
maximizing the value of this service rather than the total value).  344 
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Table 1. Varying parameter values in an optimization model for management of forests with three partly conflicting ecosystem services (wood production, moose hunting and 345 
livestock grazing), and its effect on total net present value. ‘Baseline’ resembles contemporary settings, while ‘lower’ and ‘upper’ are (realistic) extremes. The objective was to 346 
maximize total net present value throughout a planning period (30 years, 3% interest rate), with and without minimum multiuse conditions (TRI-L = at least 50 moose hunted1, 100 347 
cattle and 1 000 sheep pastured each year; TRI-H = 150 moose, 300 cattle and 3 000 sheep). By comparing the different scenarios, we can deduct the opportunity costs of taking 348 
multiuse concerns into account. Illustrated for property size 67 000 ha (43 000 ha productive forest land). 349 
Maximizing total net present value without imposing multiuse conditions (the TRI-0 scenario) 
Parameters Baseline Lower €/ha (W, H, G %) Upper €/ha (W, H, G %) 
Tree species distribution (spruce, pine, birch) (%)2 60, 30, 10 10, 30, 60 4 411 (97.2, 0.9, 1.9) 30, 60, 10   6 994 (98.6, 0.5, 0.9) 
Meat prices (moose, cattle, sheep) (€/kg) 12, 6, 4 3, 1.5, 1 5 838 (99.4, 0.2, 0.4) 60, 30, 20   6 385 (90.6, 3.2, 6.2) 
Timber market value (€/m3)3 38 10 2 473 (96.7, 1.6, 1.7) 100 15 028 (99.2, 0.2, 0.6) 
Damage intensity browsed pine (α in eq.16)4 0.21 0.99 5 926 (98.0, 0.7, 1.3) 0.01   5 913 (98.0, 0.7, 1.3) 
Spruce trampled/cattle-day ha-1 (θ in eq.17) (%)5 0.6 0.1 5 929 (98.0, 0.7, 1.3) 3   5 878 (98.0, 0.7, 1.3) 
Interest rate (% discounted per annum) 3 1 6 922 (98.0, 1.5, 0.5) 5   5 250 (98.0, 0.8, 1.2) 
Planning period (years) 30 10 5 032 (98.7, 0.7, 0.6) 80   6 466 (97.5, 0.7, 1.8) 
Total net present value (€/ha) (from wood W%, hunting H%, grazing G%)    5 923 (98.0, 0.7, 1.3)     
Maximizing total net present value given low levels of multiuse conditions (the TRI-L scenario) 
Tree species distribution (spruce, pine, birch) (%) 60, 30, 10 10, 30, 60 4 164 (97.7, 1.5, 0.8) 30, 60, 10   6 628 (98.7, 1.0, 0.3) 
Meat prices (sheep, cattle, moose) (€/kg) 12, 6, 4 3, 1.5, 1 5 661 (99.6, 0.3, 0.1) 60, 30, 20   6 219 (88.6, 5.5, 5.8) 
Timber market value (€/m3) 38 10 2 444 (95.3, 3.2, 1.5) 100 14 508 (99.4, 0.5, 0.2) 
Damage intensity browsed pine (α in eq.16) 0.21 0.99 5 730 (98.0, 1.1, 0.9) 0.01   5 653 (98.2, 1.1, 0.7) 
Spruce trampled/cattle-day ha-1 (θ in eq.17) (%) 0.6 0.1 5 777 (98.0, 1.1, 0.9) 3   5 395 (97.9, 1.2, 0.9) 
Total net present value (€/ha) (from wood W%, hunting H%, grazing G%)    5 711 (98.0, 1.1, 0.9)     
Maximizing total net present value given higher levels of multiuse conditions (the TRI-H scenario) 
Tree species distribution (spruce, pine, birch) (%) 60, 30, 10 10, 30, 60 3 339 (95.2, 3.6, 1.2) 30, 60, 10   5 557 (97.3, 2.0, 0.7) 
Meat prices (sheep, cattle, moose) (€/kg) 12, 6, 4 3, 1.5, 1 5 125 (99.0, 0.8, 0.2) 60, 30, 20   5 831 (85.6, 11.0, 3.3) 
Timber market value (€/m3) 38 10 2 290 (93.7, 4.8, 1.6) 100 13 145 (98.8, 0.9, 0.3) 
Damage intensity browsed pine (α in eq.16) 0.21 0.99 5 312 (97.0, 2.3, 0.7) 0.01   5 005 (96.9, 2.4, 0.8) 
Spruce trampled/cattle-day ha-1 (θ in eq.17) (%) 0.6 0.1 5 405 (97.1, 2.2, 0.7) 3   4 393 (96.4, 2.7, 0.9) 
Total net present value (€/ha) (from wood W%, hunting H%, grazing G%)    5 231 (97.0, 2.3, 0.8)     
1 Given that moose fecundity stays ≥ 0.5 calves/cow, cow: bull ratio stays ≤ 1.8 and no calves are orphaned due to hunting 
2 Proportion of ‘vegetation type’ in forest classified by the dominant tree of commercial timber interest 
3 Net income = revenue minus harvesting costs. Value shown is for prima quality pine, but is stratum-specific in the model 
4  Number of browsed pines determined by moose density/carrying capacity. When α approaches 1, all browsed pines are damaged, i.e. lose all monetary value 
5 Proportion of (new) trees in stages I and II that will be trampled (and lose all monetary value) per cattle-day (influenced by cattle density and carrying capacity in the model) 
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Table 2. Compromising between three partly conflicting ecosystem services in forests (wood production, moose 351 
hunting and livestock grazing), by maximizing a relative index denoting the weighted sum of realized proportion 352 
of potential performance of each service (equal or unequal weighting of services). Performance throughout a 353 
planning period of 30 years. Percentages are realized proportions for specific services, e.g. F*/Fmax for wood, 354 
where Fmax is the potential as found by maximizing wood performance in a separate scenario, and F* is the same 355 
metric to be jointly maximized using I = F*/Fmax+C*/Cmax+S*/Smax+M*/Mmax (thus, a 0-1 scale, where 1 is max). 356 
 357 
Performance 
Objective 
Total 
(I) 
Wood €/ha1 
(%) 
Cattle kg/ha 
(%) 
Sheep kg/ha 
(%) 
Moose kg/ha 
(%) 
Maximize total I (all wi=1) 0.55 5115 (88%) 1.2 (12%) 17.6 (85%) 6.9 (36%) 
Maximize I, weight cattle2 wc=2 0.6 4233 (73%) 9.6 (92%) 2.9 (14%) 5.7 (30%) 
Maximize I, weight sheep2 ws=2 0.63  5406 (93%) 0.4 (4%) 20.1 (97%) 4.6 (24%) 
Maximize I, weight moose2 wm=2 0.55 4421 (76%) 1.6 (15%) 5.0 (24%) 15.6 (80%) 
Maximize I, weight moose2 wm=4 0.66 3891 (67%) 0.0 (0%) 0.2 (1%) 19.1 (99%) 
Maximize wood3 F*/Fmax (all wi=1) 0.34 5809 (100%) 0.0 (0%) 5.4 (25%) 1.8 (9%) 
Maximize cattle3 C*/Cmax (all wi=1) 0.35  1773 (31%) 10.5 (100%) 0.1 (0%) 1.8 (9%) 
Maximize sheep3 S*/Smax (all wi=1) 0.42 3342 (58%) 0.0 (0%) 20.8 (100%) 1.9 (10%) 
Maximize moose3 M*/Mmax (all wi=1) 0.32 1674 (29%) 0.0 (0%) 0.1 (0%) 19.4 (100%) 
1 Net present value, with interest rate 3% and including expectation value 
2 These weights were arbitrarily chosen to show how different weighting affects I (and %), and do not indicate any kind of threshold levels. Weights of 
services not specified in a given scenario were set to 1 (only one service weighted differently in each scenario) 
3 These scenarios are included to show how full potential realization of one service affects the potential realization of other services. 
 358 
3.5 Evaluating the opportunity cost of multiuse using normalized performance indices and weighting  359 
A less skewed pattern of performance loss also emerged when using the normalized indices of realized 360 
potential (Table 2, column ‘Maximize total I’) compared to when using a monetary measure with no 361 
multiuse conditions (net present value, Fig. 4). The realized potential of each service (i.e. performance 362 
loss) obtained with the normalized index most closely resembled the TRI-H scenario. Assigning 363 
unequal weights to the services strongly affected their performance loss, particularly for cattle and 364 
moose. It is noteworthy that weighted scenarios produced higher total I (see discussion).  365 
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4 Discussion 366 
The output from our forest case system differed extensively when we changed the ecosystem service 367 
to be prioritized. Wood production unequivocally yielded a higher total net present value, but led to a 368 
substantial reduction in the production of goods and services from hunting and grazing. However, for 369 
a wide range of parameter settings the inclusion of multiuse conditions (set as minimum performances 370 
of the less profitable services) had minor impact on the net present value. These findings confirm other 371 
studies showing that for many ecosystem services, a relatively small sacrifice by one stakeholder 372 
group may secure large benefits to other users of the forest (e.g., Başkent et al. 2011; Duncker et al. 373 
2012; Kyllönen et al. 2006; Soltani et al. 2014). 374 
Any deviation from the maximization of total net value are difficult to accept for neo-classical 375 
economists, as it dismisses the Pareto optimum, which is a deeply ingrained economic paradigm. 376 
Resource allocation according to Pareto (1906) implies that optimality occurs when we cannot further 377 
improve the wellbeing of one stakeholder without making at least one other stakeholder worse off. In 378 
our forest case system, the Pareto optimum is represented by the TRI-0 scenario, i.e. maximizing for 379 
total net present value with no minimum multiuse conditions. Clearly, moose hunters and cattle 380 
owners would not receive much wellbeing if forest management should adhere only to a non-381 
compensating Pareto principle (Fig. 2B-C) (White 2009).  382 
As expected, when we used the compromise programming technique to optimise multi-criteria 383 
management of our case system, the unequal weighting of services strongly affected the performance 384 
(see also Zekri & Romero 1993). Our case shows that the outcome of a given weighting is not 385 
straightforward to predict when density dependent interactions are involved. For example, sheep 386 
prioritizing (ws = 2) also gave higher realization of wood potential, because more sheep meant less 387 
moose and cattle and therefore reduced damage costs. Likewise, low-level moose prioritizing (wm = 2, 388 
but not wm = 4) benefitted cattle, most likely because it facilitated a higher increase in the carrying 389 
capacity than the moose could fully consume given the set of other constraints. In a practical 390 
application of this sort of resource management, decision-makers must therefore engage in detailed 391 
discussions about which weights to be used. In the case of a large forest property, the owner may make 392 
the final decision unilaterally according to law. If too little weight is given to less superior 393 
stakeholders, the owner may, however, end up in conflict with the local community. To maintain their 394 
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social capital in the local community owners could probably benefit from compromising somewhat on 395 
the net present value (Bowles & Gintis 2002). 396 
Because wood had such a superior income potential, prioritizing a single ecosystem service in our 397 
study led to drastically different production of goods and services from hunting and grazing. This 398 
inequality is analogous to many rural economies around the world. Smaller, often subsistence-oriented 399 
stakeholders fall short if shared resources are distributed by monetary power only (Milner-Gulland 400 
2011). On the other hand, while our study illustrates the beneficial potential of multiuse conditions 401 
when dealing with conflicting ecosystem services, we should not lose sight of the fact that some 402 
ecosystem services are best managed by land sparing, rather than land sharing (Phalan et al. 2011; 403 
Vincent & Binkley 1993). Our results (Tables 1 and 2) indicate that cattle grazing may be such a 404 
service when practiced in boreal forests where it is likely to contribute only a small part of total value, 405 
with substantial negative impact on other services. In such scenarios, cattle grazing is better 406 
undertaken on separate land outside the forest. 407 
A shortcoming of our long-term planning approach is its lack of equations for dynamic 408 
stakeholder behaviour. In reality, stakeholders are continuously receiving and acting from a range of 409 
economic, social and cultural incentives (Bunnefeld & Keane 2014; Fulton et al. 2011). For example, 410 
in our case study system it is unlikely that moose hunters will have the same hunting preferences in 20 411 
years as they do today. The Nordic wood market currently fluctuates (Alajoutsijärvi et al. 2005), and 412 
past predictability of forest owner behaviours may be disrupted (Follo 2011). The more qualitative-413 
oriented approaches to optimization modelling of ecosystem services now regularly address complex 414 
stakeholder behaviour, e.g., with socioecological systems theory (SES, reviewed by Cumming 2011) 415 
and management strategy evaluation (MSE, reviewed by Bunnefeld et al. 2011). Unfortunately, 416 
studies incorporating stakeholder behaviour in a quantitative framework are generally lagging behind 417 
the more conceptual and qualitative approaches (Redpath et al. 2015). We anticipate that our capacity 418 
to better integrate social behaviour with both economics and ecology will follow as the emerging 419 
research focus on quantitative multi-criteria modelling of ecosystem services catches up. 420 
Although we in this study advocate using a quantitative model to aid ecosystem service 421 
assessment, we do not argue for the exclusive use of such models. Decision-making regarding the 422 
sustainable use of ecosystem services must always be founded in a set of adaptive processes 423 
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complementing each other (Argent 2009), as there are shortcomings associated with any single model. 424 
The scientific and social processes vital to adaptive management can be broadly summarized as: a) 425 
Identifying the appropriate spatiotemporal scales of each management option, b) retaining a focus on 426 
statistical power and controlled experiments when selecting input data, c) scenario modelling to 427 
outline potential outcome of the various management options, d) using model output to synthesize 428 
socioecological consensus on the most relevant options, e) evaluating strategic alternatives for 429 
achieving these management options, and f) communicating alternatives to the political arena for 430 
negotiation and ultimate selection. The link between stages c) and d) is particularly critical (Mapstone 431 
et al. 2008), and largely denotes where science ends and politics begin. Without a certain level of 432 
stakeholder consensus, the political decisions will be hampered, and if a decision is reached 433 
nevertheless, it is bound to exacerbate rather than mitigate conflict (Redpath et al. 2015). 434 
 435 
Conclusions 436 
The results of our study illustrate how a relatively small effort by one party (forest owners in our 437 
example) may secure large benefits to others (local hunters or livestock owners in our example). Our 438 
model approach should have the potential to mitigate conflicts of interests by providing more 439 
comprehensive metrics, thus feeding broader acceptance into the larger scheme of adaptive 440 
management processes. Provided there is sufficient empirical embedment of parameters, particularly 441 
the biological ones, trade-off models have indeed proven to be a useful way of mitigating conflicts 442 
over ecosystem services proactively rather than by remediation (Reed 2008). 443 
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